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Abstract. In the theory of algorithmic randomness, one of the central
notions is that of computable randomness. An infinite binary sequenceX
is computably random if no recursive martingale (strategy) can win an
infinite amount of money by betting on the values of the bits of X. In
the classical model, the martingales considered are real-valued, that is,
the bets made by the martingale can be arbitrary real numbers. In this
paper, we investigate a more restricted model, where only integer-valued
martingales are considered, and we study the class of random sequences
induced by this model.
1 Gambling with or without coins
One of the main approaches to define the notion of random sequence is the so-
called “unpredictability paradigm”. We say that an infinite binary sequence is
“random” if there is no effective way to win arbitrarily large amounts of money
by betting on the values of its bits. The main notion arising from this paradigm is
computable randomness, but other central notions such as Martin-Lo¨f random-
ness, Schnorr randomness, and Kurtz randomness, can be formulated in this
setting. For all of these notions, we consider models of games where the player
can, at each turn, bet any amount of money between 0 and his current capital.
In “practice” however, one cannot go into a casino and bet arbitrarily small sums
of money: there is always a unit value, and any bet made has to be a multiple of
this value. Some casinos (and games) also impose upper limits on the amount of
capital the one can gamble in each round of play. In the following exposition, we
examine the consequences of restricting betting amounts to integers and finite
sets.
To formalize the unpredictability paradigm, we need the central notion of
martingale. A martingale is a betting strategy for a fair game and is formally
represented by a function that corresponds to the gambler’s fortune at each
moment in time. Let {0, 1}∗ denote the set of all finite binary sequences, and
{0, 1}ω is the set of all countably infinite binary sequences (a.k.a reals). Any
function M : {0, 1}∗ → R+ which satisfies the fairness condition
M(σ) =
M(σ0) +M(σ1)
2
(1.1)
for all σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ is called a martingale. M(σ) corresponds to the gambler’s cap-
ital after having already bet on the finite sequence σ. The fairness condition (1.1)
says that the amount of money gained from an outcome of “0” is the same that
would be lost from an outcome of “1”. It is important to note that our definition
of martingale is a very restricted version of what is usually referred to as “mar-
tingale” in probability theory, where it is defined to be a sequence X0, X1, . . .
of real-valued random variables (possibly taking negative values) such that for
all n
E[Xn+1|X0, X1, . . . , Xn] = Xn.
To make the distinction, we call such a sequence a martingale process. A martin-
gale is called recursive if M is a recursive function. Throughout this exposition,
“martingale” and “recursive martingale” will be used synonymously.
For any A ∈ {0, 1}ω, A ↾↾ n is the finite binary sequence, or initial segment,
consisting of the first n digits of A. A denotes the complement of a set A (when
seen as a subset of N). We also identify sets with their characteristic sequences.
|σ| denotes the length of a binary sequence σ. A martingale M succeeds on A ∈
{0, 1}ω if M achieves arbitrary sums of money over A, that is, lim supnM(A ↾↾
n) =∞. Otherwise A defeats M . M Schnorr-succeeds on a set A if M succeeds
on A and there exists a recursive, non-decreasing, unbounded function f such
that f(n) < M(A ↾↾ n) for infinitely many n. M Kurtz-succeeds on a set A
if M succeeds on A and there exists a recursive, non-decreasing, unbounded
function f such that f(n) < M(A ↾↾ n) for all n. We can now define the main
classical notions of randomness in terms of martingales.
Definition 1. A sequence A ∈ {0, 1}ω is called computably random if A defeats
every martingale. If no martingale Schnorr-succeeds on A, then A is Schnorr
random. If no martingale Kurtz-succeeds on A, then A is Kurtz random (equiv-
alently, A is Kurtz random if and only if A does not belong to any Π01 subset of
{0, 1}ω of measure 0).
In this paper, we shall consider games where the player can only make bets
of integer value. For M a martingale and σ ∈ {0, 1}∗, |M(σ0)−M(σ)| is called
the wager at σ. Now, given a set V of non-negative integers, we say that a
martingale is V -valued if for all σ the wager of M at σ belongs to V , unless M
does not have enough capital in which case the wager at σ is 0. Formally, M is
V -valued if for all σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a ∈ {0, 1},M(σ) < min(V )⇒M(σa) =M(σ)
and M(σ) ≥ min(V ) ⇒ |M(σa) −M(σ)| ∈ V . A martingale whose wagers are
integers is called an integer-valued martingale. In case V is finite we say that M
is finitely-valued and if V is a singleton, that M is single-valued.
Definition 2. A real X is V -valued random if no V -valued martingale succeeds
on X . A real X is a finitely-valued / integer-valued / single-valued random if no
finitely-valued / integer-valued / single-valued martingale succeeds on X .
The rest of the paper studies how these new notions of randomness interact
with the classical ones. We will prove the implications of the following diagram:
computably random
ւ ↓
integer-valued random Schnorr random → law of large numbers
↓ ↓
finitely-valued random Kurtz random
↓ ցւ ↓
single-valued random bi-immune
and we shall further see that no other implication than those indicated (and their
transitive closure) holds. We than an infinite set is called immune if it contains
no infinite r.e. set. Even stronger, an infinite set A = {a0 < a1 < a2 < · · · } is
hyperimmune if there exists no recursive function f such that f(n) > an for all
n [13]. A (hyper)immune set whose complement is also (hyper)immune is called
bi-(hyper)immune. Thus a member of {0, 1}ω is bi-immune if and only if there
no recursive list of positions containing all 0’s or all 1’s. A set A is Σn0 if A can
be defined using a formula with n quantifiers followed by a recursive predicate
where the leading quantifier is existential. 0′ denotes the halting set, and we say
A is B-recursive if A is Turing reducible to B.
For additional background on algorithmic randomness, see the forthcoming
book of Downey and Hirschfeldt [4] and the new book of Nies [9].
If we were to ask someone what the absolute minimum one could expect from
a set called “random,” you might receive one of the following two responses:
1. The set obeys the law of large numbers.
2. The set is bi-immune.
The person who says “1” believes that a set which does not follow the law of
large numbers exhibits a probabilistic bias in its distribution of 0’s and 1’s. The
person who says “2” believes that a set with an infinite recursive subset of 0’s
or 1’s yields algorithmic bias. There exists, however, a third possibility:
3. The set is single-valued random.
“3” closely matches our intuition in the sense that one should not be able to pre-
dict successive outcomes resulting from a “random” process. From a practical
point-of-view, single-valued randomness also makes sense. If you have to sit out
21000 rounds of roulette before placing a sure bet, as might occur when gambling
on a non-bi-immune set, then with probability 1 the casino has already closed
while you were waiting for this opportunity. In Section 3, we shall prove that
notion “3” indeed differs from notions “1” and “2.”
The separation of Kurtz randomness and Schnorr randomness is folklore
(we will see in a moment how it can be proven). A somewhat more difficult
result is the separation of computable randomness and Schnorr randomness.
The separation of these two notions was proven by Wang who constructed a
Schnorr random sequence X together with a martingale M that succeeds on X .
It turns out that in Wang’s construction, the martingale M is already {0, 1}-
valued, hence it immediately follows that Schnorr randomness (a fortiori Kurtz
randomness) does not imply finitely-valued randomness (and a fortiori integer-
valued randomness).
Theorem 3 (Wang [15]). There exists a Schnorr random X ∈ {0, 1}ω and a
{0, 1}-valued martingale M such that M succeeds on X.
In Section 2 we shall see that conversely, integer-valued randomness does not
imply Schnorr randomness, and a fortiori computable randomness.
2 Integer-valued martingales and genericity
There is an essential difference between rational-valued and integer-valued mar-
tingales. The latter can always be permanently defeated while in general the
former cannot be. Consider the example of a player starting with an initial cap-
ital of 1 who at each turn bets half of its capital on the value 1 (that is, the
corresponding martingale M satisfies M(σ0) =M(σ)/2 and M(σ1) = 3M(σ)/2
for all σ ∈ {0, 1}∗). This is a rational-valued martingale with the following prop-
erty. Pick a stage s of the game; no matter how unlucky the player has been
before that stage, she always has a chance to recover. More precisely, for any
finite sequence of outcomes σ ∈ {0, 1}∗, no matter how smallM(σ) is, the player
can still win the game if the remaining of the outcomes contains a lot of 0’s (for
example the player wins against the sequence σ0000 . . .). This phenomenon no
longer holds for integer-valued martingales, and in fact the opposite is true, that
is, no matter how lucky the player has been up to stage s, there is always a risk
for her to see her strategy permanently defeated at some stage s′ > s. This is
expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let M be an integer-valued martingale. For any σ ∈ {0, 1}∗, there
exists an extension τ(σ,M) ∈ {0, 1}∗ of σ such that M(τ ′) = M(τ(σ,M)) for
all extensions τ ′ of τ(σ,M) (in particular the strategy M does not succeed on
any X ∈ {0, 1}ω extending τ(σ,M)).
Proof. LetM,σ be fixed. We construct the string τ = τ(σ,M) via the algorithm:
1. Set τ ← σ
2. While there exists an extension τ ′ of τ such that M(τ ′) < M(τ)
Choose any such τ ′ and set τ ← τ ′ (and go back to step 2.)
3. Return(τ)
Note that this is algorithm in a general sense, that is, we do not claim that
it can be implemented in a computable way (and indeed it cannot be, because
the condition of the “While” loop needs to check the values M(τ ′) for all ex-
tensions of τ and there are infinitely many of them), but only that it outputs a
correct value of τ . First, to see that the algorithm terminates, notice that after
each execution of the While loop, the value ofM(τ) is decreased, and becauseM
has integer values, this means that M(τ) is decreased by at least 1. Therefore
the While loop is executed at most k = M(σ) times. We also claim that the
output τ is correct: indeed it must fail the condition of the While loop, that is,
for all extensions τ ′ of τ one has M(τ ′) ≥ M(τ). But the fairness condition of
martingales implies that in that case, M(τ ′) = M(τ) for all extensions τ ′ of τ
(this can be checked by a straightforward induction). ⊓⊔
From a topological perspective, the above result shows that any integer-valued
martingale M is defeated on a dense open set. Indeed, for any σ, M is defeated
by every sequence X ∈ [τ(σ,M)] hence M is defeated by any sequence in the
dense open set
UM =
⋃
σ∈{0,1}∗
[τ(σ,M)]
(it is dense as for any σ, [τ(σ,M)] ⊆ [σ] by construction). Therefore, the set of
integer-valued random sequences contains the intersection over all integer-valued
martingales
⋂UM . This is a countable intersection of dense open sets, hence the
following corollary.
Corollary 5. The set of integer-valued random sequences is co-meager.
This shows that as a notion of randomness, integer-valued randomness is quite
weak. Indeed, one of the most basic properties that we can expect from a random
sequence X is that it satisfies the law of large numbers, that is, the number of
0’s in X ↾↾ n is n/2 + o(n). It is a routine exercise to show that the set of
sequences X satisfying the law of large numbers is a meager set (contained in
a countable union of closed set with empty interior). Therefore, in the sense
of Baire category, most sequences are integer-valued random but do not satisfy
the law of large numbers. On the other hand, it is well-known that any Schnorr
random sequence must satisfy the law of large numbers [9], which yields a further
corollary.
Corollary 6. There exists a sequence X ∈ {0, 1}ω which is integer-valued ran-
dom but not Schnorr random.
If we now want to compare integer-valued randomness and Kurtz random-
ness, the above results are insufficient, as the set of Kurtz random sequences
is also a co-meager set. We will prove that Kurtz randomness does not imply
integer-valued randomness by looking at the classical counterpart of Baire cat-
egory, namely genericity. Recall that a set W ⊆ {0, 1}∗ is dense if the open set⋃
σ∈W [σ] is dense or equivalently if for any string σ there exists a string in W
extending σ. We say that X ∈ {0, 1}ω is weakly n-generic if X has a prefix in
every dense Σ0n set. We further say that X is n-generic if for any (not necessarily
dense) Σ0n set of strings W , either X has a prefix in W or there exists a prefix
of X which has no extension in W . For all n ≥ 0 it holds that
weakly (n+1)-generic ⇒ n-generic ⇒ weakly n-generic.
Kurtz showed that weakly 1-genericity is enough to ensure Kurtz randomness.
Proposition 7 (Kurtz [6]). Any weakly 1-generic sequence X ∈ {0, 1}ω is
Kurtz random.
The next two theorems show that more genericity is needed to ensure integer-
valued randomness. That is, weak 2-genericity is sufficient, but 1-genericity is
not.
Theorem 8. Let X ∈ {0, 1}ω be any weakly 2-generic sequence. Then X is
integer-valued random.
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 4 that for any martingale M ∈ D, the set of
strings
WM = {σ : M(σ′) =M(σ) for all extensions σ′ of σ}
is dense. It is also easy to see that this set is recursive in 0′, in particular WM
is Σ02 . By definition, a weak-2-generic sequence X must have a prefix in WM for
all integer-valued martingales M , and it is clear that if X has a prefix in WM ,
M does not succeed on X . ⊓⊔
Theorem 9. There exists a 1-generic sequence X ∈ {0, 1}ω and a {0, 1}-valued
martingale M such that M succeeds on X.
Proof. We will build the sequence X by constructing an increasing (for the
prefix order) sequence (γn) of strings, then taking X to be the unique element
of {0, 1}ω having all of the γn as prefixes. The martingale we construct will be
{0, 2}-valued, however a successful {0, 1}-valued martingale can also be achieved
by cutting the {0, 2}-valued wagers in half.
Let (We)e∈N be an effective enumeration of all Σ
0
1 sets of strings. For all e,
set
Fe = {τ : ∃σ ∈We,|τ | and τ extends σ}
and Fmine the set of minimal elements of Fe, that is, the set of τ such that τ ∈ Fe
and no strict prefix of τ is in Fe. Note that whenever a string σ is in Fe, then so
are all strings that extend σ, and whenever a string σ is Fmine , then no strict ex-
tension of σ is. It is clear that the Fe and F
min
e are (uniformly) recursive sets, and
also easy to see that a sequence Y ∈ {0, 1}ω is 1-generic if and only if for all e, ei-
ther Y has a prefix in Fe (resp. F
min
e ) or some prefix of Y has no extension in Fe.
We start by defining the martingaleM which will succeed on the sequence X .
It is defined by M(ǫ) = 12 and for all σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a ∈ {0, 1}:
M(σa) =


M(σ) + 2 if M(σ) ≥ permit(σ) and a = 1
M(σ)− 2 if M(σ) ≥ permit(σ) and a = 0
M(σ) if M(σ) < permit(σ)
where the function permit is defined inductively by
permit(ǫ) = 4;
permit(σa) = min
[{permit(σ) + 1} ∪ {4e+ 4 : σa ∈ Fmine }] .
for σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a ∈ {0, 1}. It is also easy to see that permit and M are
recursive, andM is integer-valued (its values are positive because permit(σ) ≥ 4
for all σ, hence M is never allowed to make a bet if its capital is less than 4).
We now define the sequence of strings (γn), and an auxiliary sequence (ζn)
by setting γ0 = ǫ, ζ0 = ǫ and inductively, for all n:
(a) if there exists an extension of γn in Fn then let ζn+1 be a shortest such
extension (chosen effectively), and
(b) if there exists no such extension, let ζn+1 = γn.
Finally, define γn+1 = ζn+111111111.
Note that ζn can be determined from γn using the oracle 0
′, hence the se-
quence X obtained in this construction (by taking the limit of the γn, or equiv-
alently the limit of the ζn) is also recursive in 0
′. We now prove that X is as
wanted by a series of claims.
(i) X is 1-generic. Indeed, at stage n of the construction, either ζn is in Fn (in
fact in Fminn ) or no extension of ζn is in Fn.
(ii) In both cases (a) and (b) of the construction, we ensure that no strict ex-
tension of ζn is in F
min
n . Indeed either case (a) holds, and ζn is itself in F
min
n
in which case no strict extension of ζn is, or case (b) holds, in which case no
extension of ζn is in Fn, and fortiori no extension is in F
min
n . Additionally,
for all n, ζn is a strict extension of all ζk for k < n, therefore we conclude by
induction that for all n and all k ≤ n, no strict extension of ζn is in Fmink .
(iii) For all n, permit(ζn) ≥ 4n+ 4, and moreover, any string σ extending ζn by
at least 4 bits satisfies permit(σ) ≥ 4n+8. This is shown by induction. First,
this holds for n = 0: all values of the function permit are greater or equal
to 4, in particular, permit(ζ0) ≥ 4. Now suppose that permit(ζn) ≥ 4n+ 4
for some n. As we have seen in claim (ii) above, no strict extension of ζn is
in Fk for any k ≤ n. Thus, for any extension ζ′ of ζn and a ∈ {0, 1} we have
by definition of permit: permit(ζ′a) ≥ min{permit(ζ′) + 1, 4n+ 8}. From
this, we see by a straightforward induction that string σ extending ζn by 4
bits or more satisfies permit(σ) ≥ 4n+ 8. In particular, ζn+1 extends ζn by
at least 8 bits, hence permit(ζn+1) ≥ 4n+8, which concludes the induction.
(iv) Similarly, for all n, permit(γn) ≥ 4n + 4. This is true for n = 0, and for
n > 0, since γn is an extension of ζn−1 by 8 bits, it follows from (iii) that
permit(γn) ≥ 4(n− 1) + 8 = 4n+ 4.
(v) For all n, M(γn) ≥ permit(γn) + 8. This is true for n = 0. For the in-
duction step, we need to distinguish two cases depending on how γn+1
was constructed from γn. If we are in the above case (b), then γn+1 =
γn11111111, and sinceM(γn) > permit(γn),M bets and wins 8 consecutive
times, and thus M(γn+1) =M(γn) + 16. Also, in that case permit(γn+1) ≤
permit(γn) + 8 by definition of permit (adding one bit to a string can only
increase the value of permit by 1). From these two facts we can conclude
that M(γn+1) ≥ permit(γn+1)+ 8. Suppose now that γn+1 was constructed
according to case (a) above. In that case, we need to precisely analyze the
behavior of M and permit between ζn and γn, i.e. on strings of type ζnη
with 0 ≤ |η| ≤ |γn| − |ζn|. First, ζn is an extension of γn−1 hence by (ii) no
string ζnη is in F
min
k for k < n. Additionally, since γn belongs to F
min
n , no
prefix of γn does. This shows by definition of permit that for |η| ≤ 4 one has
permit(ζnη) = permit(ζn)+|η| and for |η| ≥ 4 one has permit(ζnη) ≥ 4n+8.
On the other hand,M(γn) ≥ permit(γn)+8 ≥ 4n+12 (by (iv)). SinceM can
only decrease by 2 at each move, we have M(ζnη) ≥ 4n+ 6 for any |η| ≤ 3.
But if |η| ≥ 4, as we just saw, the value of permit(ζnη) is at least 4n+8, and
the martingaleM is never allowed to bet if its capital is below permit. Hence,
it follows thatM(ζnη) ≥ 4n+6 whenever 0 ≤ |η| ≤ |γn|− |ζn|. In particular,
M(ζn) ≥ 4n+ 6, and since we are in case (a), permit(ζn) ≤ 4n+ 4, thus M
is allowed to bet and wins 8 times consecutively, and M(γn+1) ≥ 4n + 22.
Finally, we have permit(γn+1) ≤ permit(ζn) + 8 ≤ 4n + 12. This finishes
the induction.
We have seen in (i) that X is 1-generic, and from (iv) and (v), it follows that
lim supnM(γn) = +∞, hence M succeeds on X . ⊓⊔
The sequence X constructed in this last proof is 1-generic, hence by Kurtz’s
result mentioned above X is also Kurtz random. We therefore get the immediate
corollary.
Corollary 10. There exists a sequence X ∈ {0, 1}ω which is Kurtz random but
not integer-valued random.
The converse of this result is also true, that is there exists a sequence X which
is integer-valued random but not Kurtz random. To prove this, we will need a
different approach, via measure-theoretic arguments, which we will present in
Section 4.
Strictly speaking, integer-valued martingales not only impose a lower limit on
betting amounts but also require that all wagers be a multiple of the minimum
bet. We are therefore left with a question regarding the robustness of integer-
valued randomness: if we remove the requirement that wagers must be a multiple
of the minimum bet, do we still obtain the same notion of randomness?
Open question 11. Let V be the set of all computable reals greater than or
equal to 1 unioned with {0}. Is V -valued random the same as integer-valued
random?
3 Finitely-valued martingales
We now consider the effects of imposing betting limits on martingale strategies.
First we separate integer-valued randomness from finitely-valued randomness.
Theorem 12. There exists an integer-valued martingale which succeeds on a
finitely-valued random.
Proof. Partition the natural numbers into finite intervals, with 2n intervals of
length n followed by 2n+1 intervals of length n+ 1 for every n. In a picture:
I1,1I1,2I2,1 . . . I2,22I3,1 . . . I3,23I4,1 . . . I4,24I5,1 . . .
where each interval In,· has length n. Consider the class of all sets A which
guarantees that at least one “1” lies in each of these intervals. An integer-valued
martingale can succeeds on any set in this class by using the “classic” martingale
strategy: in each interval bet $1 on outcome “1”, then bet $2 on outcome “1”,
then bet $4 on outcome “1”, etc. until the bet is successful and then stop betting
until the next interval. In this way, the gambler nets $1 income over each interval.
After doing this for each of the 2n intervals of length n, she has enough money
to continue this strategy on the next intervals of length n + 1. Therefore some
integer-valued martingale succeeds on every member of A.
On the other hand, we now find a B ∈ A on which no finitely-valued mar-
tingale succeeds. Let M0,M1,M2, . . . be a list of all finitely-valued martingales.
Let B(0) = 1. For induction assume B has been defined up through In, and try
to define B on In+1 so that
– for some e, Me loses some money over In+1, and
– for every j < e, Mj gains no money over In+1.
If all the intervals B are chosen so as to satisfy these requirements, then all
finitely-valued martingales will be obliterated. Indeed each index can only be
chosen finitely many times to play the role of e before all the capital of Me is
destroyed, and therefore the choice of e must go to infinity.
While it is impossible to choose values for B so that these requirements
are satisfied on every interval, we can satisfy them often enough to defeat ev-
ery finitely-valued martingale. Assuming that In−1 has been built, we describe
how to build In. Recall that a finitely-valued martingale always wagers integer
dollar amounts. For each finitely-valued martingale M , let max(M) denote the
maximum possible bet for M , and let
L(e) =
∑
j≤e
[max(Mj) + 1] .
Claim: Values for B can be chosen in In so that Me loses money if she makes
a nonzero wager before the last L(e) positions of the interval and is the
lowest-indexed martingale to do so. Furthermore for all j < e, Mj does not
gain any money over In with these values for B.
Thus ifM0 bets before the last L(0) positions of In, B can forceM0 to lose money,
thereby satisfying the construction requirements. So we need only consider the
case where M0 bets no money before the last L(0) positions of In. By applying
the claim above inductively, we may assume that
– each successive Me bets no money prior to the last L(e) positions of In, and
– for each j ≤ e, Mj earns no profit over In.
Eventually B must encounter some martingale Ms which is stupid enough to
bet money at the beginning of the interval, at which point the requirements for
In can be satisfied (assuming In is sufficiently long to have such a “beginning.”)
If In is not longer than L(s) then the requirements are not satisfied on In. But
we do not worry about this failure because for all e such that L(e) < |In|, the
way of choosing intervals prevents Me from ever earning money again on any
interval In+k (k ≥ 0). Thus for every e, there is a sufficiently large N so that for
all n > N , e gains no money from betting on In. So B defeats all finitely-valued
martingales.
It remains to prove the claim. We argue by induction. Suppose that M0
makes a nonzero wager prior to the last L(0) positions of the interval In, say at
position x0. We show how B can force M(0) to lose money over In. B can act
adversarially throughout the interval except for the constraint inherited from
the class A. It follows that M0’s betting amounts must be nondecreasing from
position x0 until the end of the interval. If not, then B can spend its obligatory
“1” at the position where M0 decreased her bets. M0 already has a net loss at
this point of decrease, and B can continue to act adversarially until the end.
Therefore a decrease in betting amounts after x0 would cause M0 to lose. Hence
M0 is forced to bet at least $1 each of L(0) times. By the final bet in In, M0 is
already behind by at least max(M0)+1, so this bet is irrelevant;M0 has already
lost.
Since we have already proved the claim when M0 bets before the last L(0)
positions, we can now focus on the case where M0 bets only during the last L(0)
positions. Now it is easy to preventM0 from winning any money: B places a “1”
anywhere before the |In|−L(0) position and then B can act adversarially on the
last L(0) positions. Any nonzero wager from M0 will now instantly result in a
loss for M0 because B is free to everywhere disagree with M0. Hence it suffices
to consider the case whereM0 does not bet anywhere and B is obligated to post
a “1” somewhere before the last |In| − L(0) positions.
Curiously,M1 now finds herself in exactly the same situation thatM0 started
with. By same argument as above, B can forceM1 to lose money ifM1 bets prior
to |In|−L(1). Therefore we can reduce to the case whereM1 never bets and B is
obligated to provide a “1” somewhere before L(2). The same argument holds for
M2,M3, . . . . Eventually some martingale Me has money and is stupid enough
to bet before L(e). At this point, the claim is proved. ⊓⊔
Remark. B is 0′-recursive in the above construction.
Schnorr showed that for any set A, a real-valued martingale succeeds on A if
and only if a rational-valued martingale succeeds on A (see [11], or [9] p.270).
His proof, however, does not carry over to the finitely-valued case.
Open question 13. If we allow finitely-valued martingales to bet real values
instead of rationals, do we get the same class of finitely-valued randoms?
3.1 On single-valued randoms
For the following discussion, it is useful to keep in mind that a real is single-valued
random if and only if it is {1}-valued random; the particular dollar amount
which is bet each round is immaterial. For comparison with Kurtz randomness,
we appeal directly to a theorem of Doob ([3] p.324). The following version for
“non-negative” martingales appears in Ross’s book ([10], p.316).
Theorem 14. For every martingale M , the set of reals on which M succeeds
has measure zero. Furthermore, the capital of M converges to some finite value
with probability 1.
Later, in Lemma 31, we shall appeal to a more general version of Theorem 14
(see Billingsley [2] p.468). A supermartingale process a sequence X0, X1, . . . of
real-valued random variables (possibly taking negative values) such that for all n
E[Xn+1|X0, X1, . . . , Xn] ≤ Xn.
Theorem 15 (Doob’s Martingale Convergence Theorem). Let X0, X1, . . .
be a supermartingale process (where each Xi is a random variable). If for some
m ∈ R, we have Xn ≥ m for all n, then almost surely limn→∞Xn exists and is
finite.
Proposition 16. Every Kurtz random is single-valued random.
Proof. Suppose that some single-valued martingaleM succeeds on a real X . Let
F denote the set of reals on which M converges to some finite value. Then X
does not belong to F , and F has measure one by Theorem 14. Hence X belongs
to the measure zero set F .
By definition of single-valued, M is required to bet at every position of the
input real. Hence the only way for M to converge to a finite value is to reach
the value 0 and become constant. Therefore F is, in fact, the set of reals on
which M eventually goes broke. Thus F is the set of all infinite paths through
the tree {σ : M(σ) > 0}. It follows that F is a recursive Π01 class. In summary,
X belongs to a recursive Π01 class of measure zero and therefore is not Kurtz
random. ⊓⊔
Remark. The above argument shows even more: every Kurtz random is V -valued
random for any positive set of integers V .
As promised in the introduction, we now separate the incomparable notions of
bi-immunity, single-valued random, and law of large numbers. The reals sat-
isfying the law of large numbers and the bi-immune reals are already known
to be different. Their separation can be deduced from the argument given in
Proposition 20 with “bi-immune” substituted for “single-valued random.”
Theorem 17. There exists a single-valued random which is neither immune nor
co-immune.
Proof. Let M0,M1, . . . be a list of all possible {1}-computable “gamblers,”
namely a list of pairs consisting of martingales and their respective initial capital.
Define a set A such that
– A(n) = 1 if n ≡ 0 mod 6, and
– A(n) = 0 if n ≡ 3 mod 6.
The remaining values of A work adversarially against the Mi’s. Since the gam-
blers must bet exactly $1 on each value of A, the remaining values of A can be
chosen so as to force any particular gambler to decrease his capital by a dollar
over the course of any three consecutive rounds of play. We define the first initial
segment of A so as to exhaust the capital of M0, the following interval of A so
as to exhaust the capital of M1, etc. Since each gambler has only finite capital
at any moment, each gambler’s capital is exhausted after a finite period of time.
Therefore no {1}-valued martingale succeeds on A. Furthermore, by the values
assigned at multiples of 3, A contains an infinite recursive set as does its com-
plement. ⊓⊔
Theorem 18. There exists a 0′-recursive, bi-hyperimmune set which is not
single-valued random.
Proof. Let ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . be a list of the partial recursive functions. Define a
0′-recursive function f satisfying
(∀e < n) [ϕe(f(n)) ↓ =⇒ f(n+ 1) > ϕe(f(n)) + 2]
and let
A = {x : (∃n) [f(2n) ≤ x < f(2n+ 1)]}.
Now A = {a0, a1, a2, . . . } is bi-hyperimmune because for any recursive ϕk,
ϕk[f(2k + 1)] < f(2k + 2)− 2 ≤ af(2k+1) − 1,
and a similar inequality holds for the complement of A. On the other hand,
the single-valued martingale strategy which bets on A(n+ 1) what the gambler
saw at A(n) will succeed on A. This strategy indeed succeeds because each time
A(n + 1) disagrees with A(n), we have that A(n + 2) and A(n + 3) agree with
A(n+1). So over each three consecutive rounds of betting, the gambler increases
his capital by at least $1. ⊓⊔
Proposition 16 and Theorem 18 together give:
Corollary 19. There exists a bi-immune set which is not Kurtz random.
Proposition 20. Single-valued random does not imply the law of large numbers
and vice-versa.
Proof. Unlike the set of reals which satisfy the law of large numbers, the set of
single-valued randoms is co-meager (by Corollary 5). Moreover, the real .010101010 . . .
satisfies the law of large numbers but is not single-valued random. ⊓⊔
Finally, we note that it is possible to separate single-valued randomness from
finite-valued randomness using an argument along the lines of Proposition 17.
Proposition 21. There exists a {1, 2}-valued martingale which succeeds on a
single-valued random.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 17, we partition the natural numbers into intervals
of length 5. For the first two numbers n in each interval (that is, n congruent to
0 or 1 (mod 5)), set A(n) = 0 so that gambler can win at these places. The last
three spots in each interval are adversarial against the single-valued martingales.
A will be able to defeat the {1}-valued martingale since the best single-valued
martingale strategy would first gain $2 and then lose $3 on each interval, for
a net loss of $1 per interval. Eventually the single-valued martingale will run
out of money. On the other hand, there exists a {1, 2}-valued martingale which
always bets $2 on each of the first two numbers and $1 on the last three numbers
in each interval, for a net gain of at least $4 - $3 = $1 per interval (regardless
of any adversarial action that may occur in the last 3 places). Thus the money
for this {1, 2}-valued martingale on A goes to infinity. ⊓⊔
3.2 On {0,1}-valued randoms
We can also separate single-valued randomness from finite-valued randomness.
Proposition 22. Let V be any set containing 0 and at least one other number n.
Then any V -valued random is bi-immune.
Proof. Let A be a set which is not bi-immune; without loss of generality assume
that A contains an infinite recursive set B. Then a V -valued martingale strategy
which bets n dollars on members of B and 0 on A−B will succeed on A. ⊓⊔
The following corollary is a consequence of the definition of finitely-valued ran-
dom and Proposition 22.
Corollary 23. finitely-valued random =⇒ {0, 1}-valued random =⇒ bi-
immune.
Since single-valued random does not imply bi-immune (Theorem 17), we obtain
from Corollary 23:
Corollary 24. There exists a {0, 1}-valued random which is not single-valued
random.
Although we were able to separate single-valued randomness from {1, 2}-valued
randomness (Proposition 21), the comparison between {0, 1}-valued randoms
and {0, 1, 2}-valued randoms seems less clear. We leave the reader with the fol-
lowing interesting question.
Open question 25. Is {0, 1}-valued random the same as finitely-valued ran-
dom?
4 Integer-valued martingales and Bernoulli measures
In this last section, we present a proof of the fact that integer-valued randomness
does not imply Kurtz randomness. We will get a counter example by choosing
a sequence X at random with respect to some carefully-chosen probability mea-
sure.
Intuitively speaking, the Lebesgue measure λ on the space {0, 1}ω corre-
sponds to the random trial where all bits are obtained by independent tosses of
a balanced 0/1-coin. An interesting generalization of Lebesgue measure is the
class of Bernoulli measures, where for a given parameter δ ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] we
construct a sequence X by independent tosses of a coin with bias δ (that is, the
coin gives 1 with probability 1/2+ δ and 0 with probability 1/2− δ. This can be
further generalized by considering an infinite sequence of independent coin tosses
where the nth coin tossed has bias δn. This leads to the notion of generalized
Bernoulli measures. Formally, on the space {0, 1}ω, given a sequence (δn)n∈N of
numbers in [−1/2, 1/2], a generalized Bernoulli measure of parameter (δn)n∈N is
the unique measure µ such that for all σ ∈ {0, 1}∗:
µ([σ]) =
∏
n : σ(n)=0
(1 − pn)
∏
n : σ(n)=1
pn
where pn = 1/2 + δn. One can expect that if the δn are very small (that is, δn
tends to 0 quickly), then the generalized Bernoulli measure of parameter (δn)n∈N
will not differ much from Lebesgue measure. This was made precise by Kakutani.
Theorem 26 (Kakutani [5]). Let µ be the generalized Bernoulli measure of
parameter (δn)n∈N. If the condition∑
n∈N
δ2n <∞ (4.1)
holds, then µ is equivalent to Lebesgue measure λ, that is, for any subset X of
{0, 1}ω, µ(X ) = 0 if and only if λ(X ) = 0. If condition (4.1) does not hold, then
µ and λ are inconsistent, that is, there exists some Y such that µ(Y) = 0 while
λ(Y) = 1.
If we want to work in a computability setting, we need to consider computable
generalized Bernoulli measures, that is, those for which the parameter (δn)n∈N
is a recursive sequence of reals. Vovk [14] showed a constructive analogue of
Kakutani’s theorem for computable generalized Bernoulli measures in relation
with Martin-Lo¨f randomness (perhaps the most famous effective notion of ran-
domness, but we do not need it in this paper). The Kakutani-Vovk result has
been used many times in the literature [1,7,8,12]. In particular, Bienvenu and
Merkle proved the following.
Theorem 27 (Bienvenu and Merkle [1]). Let µ be a computable generalized
Bernoulli measure of parameter (δn)n∈N. If
∑
n δ
2
n = +∞, then the class of Kurtz
random sequences has µ-measure 0.
To prove that integer-valued randomness does not imply Kurtz randomness, we
will construct a computable generalized Bernoulli measure µ whose parameter
(δn)n∈N converges to 0 sufficiently slowly to have
∑
n δ
2
n = +∞ (hence by the
above µ-almost all sequences X are not Kurtz random, which we will make even
more precise) but sufficiently quickly to make µ close to Lebesgue measure and
ensure that µ-almost all sequences are integer-valued random.
Theorem 28. There exists a sequence X ∈ {0, 1}ω which is integer-valued ran-
dom but not Kurtz random.
Proof. We obtain X by choosing a random sequence with respect to the gener-
alized Bernoulli measure of parameter (δn) with
δn =
1√
n lnn
for all n > 1 (the values of δ0 and δ1 can be set arbitrarily). We have
∑n
i=2 δ
2
i ∼
ln lnn (this because
∫
(t ln t)−1dt = ln ln t, in particular
∑
i δ
2
i = +∞). By Theo-
rem 27, a sequence X chosen at random according to the measure µ will not be
(with probability 1) Kurtz random. We can even exhibit a martingale M which
wins against µ-almost all sequences X . It is defined by M(ǫ) = 1 and for any
string σ of length n:
M(σ0) = (1− 2δn)M(σ) and M(σ1) = (1 + 2δn)M(σ).
This martingale is in fact the optimal martingale: when playing against a se-
quence X that is chosen at random with respect to a measure ν, the optimal
martingale is defined by M(σ) = ν([σ])/λ([σ]). It is optimal in the sense that
for any other martingale M ′, we have for µ-almost all X ∈ {0, 1}ω: M ′(X ↾↾
n) = O[M(X ↾↾ n)] (see for example [1]). Here, if we take for ν our gen-
eralized Bernoulli measure µ, the optimal martingale is exactly the martin-
gale M . By Theorem 27, for µ-almost all X , X is not Kurtz random, that
is, there exists a real-valued martingale M ′ and a recursive order h such that
M ′(X ↾↾ n) ≥ h(n). But by optimality, for any real-valued martingale M ′ and
µ-almost all X , M ′(X ↾↾ n) = O[M(X ↾↾ n)]. Putting all this together, there
exists a recursive order h such that M(X ↾↾ n) ≥ h(n) for all n and µ-almost
all X .
However (and this will be crucial for the rest of the argument), M succeeds
quite slowly on average.
Lemma 29. Let r > 0 be a real number. Then for µ-almost all X ∈ {0, 1}ω,
one has M(X ↾↾ n) = o(nr).
In order to prove this, we now see X as a random variable with distribution µ.
We set for all n:
Vn =M(X ↾↾ n) (4.2)
which is a martingale process. Then set
Ln = ln(Vn) (4.3)
By definition of M we have for all n
Vn+1 =
{
(1 + 2δn)Vn with probability 1/2 + δn
(1− 2δn)Vn with probability 1/2− δn (4.4)
thus
Ln+1 =
{
Ln + ln(1 + 2δn) with probability 1/2 + δn
Ln + ln(1− 2δn) with probability 1/2− δn (4.5)
Setting
en = E[Ln+1 − Ln] = (1/2 + δn) ln(1 + 2δn) + (1/2− δn) ln(1− 2δn) (4.6)
(note en passant that en ∼ 2δ2n by same method as (4.19)) we see that
L′n = Ln −
n−1∑
i=0
ei (4.7)
is a martingale process. For all n we have |L′n+1−L′n| ≤ en+2δn (here we use the
fact that ln(1 + x) ≤ x for all x > −1). We can thus apply Azuma’s Inequality
[?,?,10] to L′n: for all integers n and positive real a one has
µ{L′n ≥ a} ≤ exp
(
− a
2∑n−1
i=0 (ei + 2δi)
2
)
(4.8)
Taking a = r lnn (for an arbitrarily small real r > 0) in (4.8) we get
µ{L′n ≥ r lnn} ≤ exp
(
− r
2(lnn)2∑n−1
i=0 (ei + 2δi)
2
)
(4.9)
Since ei ∼ 2δ2i , we have ei = o(δi), so
n−1∑
i=0
(ei + 2δi)
2 ∼
n−1∑
i=0
(2δi)
2 ∼ 2 ln lnn (4.10)
Thus for any n large enough:
− r
2(lnn)2∑n−1
i=0 (ei + 2δi)
2
≤ −2 lnn (4.11)
Putting (4.9) and (4.11) together, we get
µ{L′n ≥ r lnn} ≤
1
n2
(4.12)
for almost all n. By the Borel-Cantelli lemma [10], since
∑
n 1/n
2 converges,
with µ-probability 1 the event [L′n ≥ r lnn] happens only finitely often, that is,
with probability 1, for any r > 0 and almost all n, L′n ≤ r lnn. Since
Ln = L
′
n +
n−1∑
i=0
ei
and
∑n−1
i=0 ei ∼ 2 ln lnn, it follows similarly that, with µ probability 1, for
any r > 0 and almost all n, Ln ≤ r lnn. And as Ln = ln[M(X ↾↾ n)], all this
entails that with µ-probability 1,M(X ↾↾ n) ≤ nr for any r > 0 and almost all n.
This proves Lemma 29.
Let D denote the class of integer-valued martingales. We now consider a re-
striction of integer-valued martingales: let D′ be the subset of D, consisting of
the integer-valued martingales M that further satisfy M(σ) <
√
|σ| for almost
all σ. The following lemma shows that the martingales in D′ are essentially as
powerful as martingales in D against sequences X chosen at random according
to µ.
Lemma 30. Let M ∈ D. For µ-almost all X, there exists M ′ ∈ D′ such that
M ′(X ↾↾ n) =M(X ↾↾ n) for almost all n.
Let M ∈ D. By Lemma 29, M(X ↾↾ n) = o(√n) almost surely. Hence, for µ-
almost all X , there exists some n0 and all n > n0, M(X ↾↾ n) ≤
√
n/2. For such
a pair (X,n0), we call “invalid” all strings σ such that there exists a prefix τ of σ
such that |τ | ≥ n0 and either M(τ0) >
√
|τ | or M(τ1) >
√
|τ |, and “valid” any
string that is not invalid. Now, define the martingaleM ′ byM ′(σ) =M(X ↾↾ n0)
for all σ with |σ| ≤ n0 and for all σ with |σ| > n0, set M ′(σ) to be M(τ) with τ
the longest prefix of σ that is valid. In other words, M ′ is the trimmed version
of M that stops betting forever whenever M makes at stage n > n0 a bet that
gives it a chance to get a capital >
√
n. It is easy to see that M ′ is itself a
martingale, integer-valued as M is, and since M(X ↾↾ n) ≤ √n/2 for all n > n0,
all prefixes of X are valid, hence M ′(X ↾↾ n) = M(X ↾↾ n) for all n ≥ n0. This
proves the lemma.
Finally, we prove that martingales in D′ are almost surely defeated by a
µ-random X .
Lemma 31. Let M ∈ D′. For µ-almost all X, M does not succeed on X.
Let n0 be such that M(σ) ≤
√
|σ| for all σ of length ≥ n0. Again, we see X
as a µ-random variable and define Vn by
Vn =M(X ↾↾ n) (4.13)
(note that by definition of D′, we have Vn ≤
√
n for all n ≥ n0) and Ln by
Ln = ln[M(X ↾↾ n)] (4.14)
with the convention ln(0) = −1. For all n, define also
ρn =
M(X ↾↾ n+ 1)−M(X ↾↾ n)
M(X ↾↾ n)
(4.15)
which is the fraction of its capital the martingale M bets on 1 at stage n. It can
be negative if M bets on 0 and is by convention 1 if M(X ↾↾ n) = 0. Similarly
to (4.5), we have for all n:
Ln+1 =
{
Ln + ln(1 + ρn) with probability 1/2 + δn
Ln + ln(1− ρn) with probability 1/2− δn (4.16)
Thus we have:
E[Ln+1 − Ln] = (1/2 + δn) ln(1 + ρn) + (1/2− δn) ln(1− ρn) (4.17)
=
1
2
ln(1− ρ2n) + δn ln(1 + ρn)− δn ln(1− ρn) (4.18)
≤ −ρ
2
n
2
+ 2δnρn (4.19)
(for the last inequality, we use again that ln(1 + x) ≤ x for all x ≥ −1, which
is true even for x = −1 with our convention ln(0) = −1). Now, observe that ρn
is either 0, or of the form m
Vn
for some integer m as M is integer-valued. In the
first case Ln+1 = Ln and in the second case, since Vn ≤
√
n for almost all n, we
have |ρn| ≥ 1/
√
n for almost all n, and therefore E[Ln+1 − Ln] ∼ − ρ
2
n
2 < 0 as
δn = o(1/
√
n) = o(ρn). This shows that Ln is ultimately a supermartingale, and
it is bounded from below by ln(0) = −1. By Doob’s Martingale Convergence
Theorem Ln converges to a finite value µ-almost surely, hence the same is true
for Vn = exp(Ln). Therefore Vn is µ-almost surely bounded, henceM is µ-almost
surely defeated. This finishes the proof of Lemma 31.
Theorem 28 now easily follows. Take some X ∈ {0, 1}ω at random accord-
ing to µ. By Lemma 31, X defeats all M ∈ D′ µ-almost surely, therefore by
Lemma 30, X defeats all M ∈ D µ-almost surely. And finally, by definition of
µ and Theorem 27, X is µ-almost surely not Kurtz random. Therefore, X is
µ-almost surely as wanted, hence the existence of at least one X as wanted. ⊓⊔
5 Non-monotonic betting strategies
A non-monotonic betting strategy is a betting strategy in which the gambler
can bet on the bits of a sequence in any order she chooses [7]. A set X is
Kolmogorov-Loveland random if no recursive non-monotonic betting strategy
succeeds on X and Martin-Lo¨f random if no martingale with an increasing,
recursive approximation succeeds on X . By a theorem of Muchnik, Semenov,
and Uspensky [8] every Martin-Lo¨f random is Kolmogorov-Loveland random,
however the reverse containment remains a major open question for the field of
algorithmic randomness.
In the real-valued martingale case, every set which is computably random
relative to K is also Martin-Lo¨f random (unrelativized, follows from martingale
definition of ML-random) and hence Kolmogorov-Loveland random. The situa-
tion is a bit different for the case of integer-valued martingales. We shall show
that no oracle can be given to a integer-valued martingale which will make it as
powerful as its non-monotonic counterpart.
Theorem 32. For every oracle B there is a set A ≤T B′ and a non-monotonic
{0, 1}-valued martingale such that the non-monotonic martingale wins on A
while every B-recursive monotonic martingale fails to win on A.
Proof. LetM1,M2,M3, . . . be a B
′-recursive list of all integer-valued B-recursive
martingales with the additional property thatMm starts with at most 2
m dollars;
note that such a list can be made by following the mth program as long as that
program belongs to an integer-valued martingale with desired properties and
to freeze the martingale as constant (always betting 0) if at some time the B-
recursive martingale turns out to be partial or otherwise ill-defined. Note that
although themth programmight not be total, theMm are all total and uniformly
B-recursive.
The idea is to construct a recursive partition I0, I1, I2, . . . of intervals such
that In is so long that only the minority of the positions in the interval are used
to behave adversarially to M1,M2, . . . ,Mn while the majority of the x in the
interval satisfies A(x) = A[min(In)]. The basic idea is to select A as follows on
x ∈ In:
A(x) =


b if Mm bets a positive value on 1− b and
all Mk with 1 ≤ k < m abstain from betting;
0 if x = min(In) and
M1,M2, . . . ,Mn abstain from betting;
A[min(In)] if x > min(In) and
M1,M2, . . . ,Mn abstain from betting.
Note that the length of In is determined although one does not know any-
thing about the martingales. Let a1 = 2
min(In)+1 and inductively am+1 =
2min(In)+m+a1+a2+...+am . The idea is that am stands for the largest value which
Mm can reach on the interval In; the upper bound is determined by assuming
that Mm — in the worst case — can double its capital whenever the interval In
is not yet reached or that a martingale Mk with k < m is betting which is then
given priority in the definition of A. One can now verify by induction that each
Mm can bet on In only at most am times until it would go broke and therefore
there are at most a1 places where M1 bets and loses 1 out of its capital; fur-
thermore there are at most a2 places where M2 bets but M1 does not bet and
on these M2 loses 1 out of its capital; there are at most a3 places where M3
bets inside In and M1,M2 do not bet and on these places M3 loses 1 out of its
capital. In total there are at most a1 + a2 + . . .+ an places on In where one of
the martingales M1,M2, . . . ,Mn are betting and therefore by taking In to have
the length 2(1 + a1 + a2 + . . .+ an) one gets that A[min(In)] coincides with the
majority of the values A(x) with x ∈ In − {min(In)}.
This property permits to implement a non-monotonous recursive betting
strategy which for every interval In first reads all the values A(x) with x ∈
In − {min(In)} without betting any money on these values and then bets 1 ac-
cording to the majority of the bits read before on the value A[min(In)]; this
bet is correct and a sure win. Hence A can be recognized by a non-monotonous
{0, 1}-valued martingale.
Furthermore, one can find by induction values x1, x2, . . . such that xn ≥
min(In) and from xn onwards no martingale Mm with m < n is betting on A.
This is obviously possible for x1 = min(I1) as the other part of the condition is
void. Now, wheneverM1 bets on A beyond x1, the outcome is negative as A gives
highest priority to diagonalizeM1. Therefore,M1 can bet only finitely often until
the capital is used off and one can just take x2 to be the maximum of min(I2)
and the last time whereM1 places a positive bet on A. Hence x2 exists and from
x2 onwards,M1 does not bet on A and thereforeM2 is diagonalized with highest
priority by A; again there are only finitely many positive bets and x3 can be
chosen as the first value after these finitely many bets and after min(I3). Hence
one can inductively define the xn and verify that Mn never has more capital
than 2xn+1+n. Thus noMn succeeds on A and A is integer-valued random (with
respect to B-recursive monotonous martingales). ⊓⊔
We conclude with a canonical problem.
Open question 33. Do there exist other characterizations for integer-valued,
finite-valued, or single-valued randoms in terms of Kolmogorov complexity or
Martin-Lo¨f statistical tests?
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